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INCE 1973, when Title 2, Parent and Child, of the Family Code was
first adopted,' each session of the Texas Legislature has enacted nu-
merous changes in the code's provisions. Thus, in the area of family
law, practitioners and judges must constantly check statutes for substantive
changes, and effective dates. Most of the changes made during the regular
seventieth session of the Texas Legislature took effect September 1, 1987,2
except some that took effect June 19, 1987.3 Those enacted during the sec-
ond called special session took effect November 1, 1987. 4
While the legislature made a number of minor, housekeeping changes, 5 it
also made two major changes based on policy decisions, and further revised
the means of enforcement of child support. The policy changes relate to
acceptance of the concept of joint custody and to the courts' acknowledg-
ment of the equal rights of fathers of illegitimate children established by the
decision in In re McLean.6
Divorced fathers have been battling for a larger role in their children's
lives and have viewed joint managing conservatorship as one solution. 7 In
the past, Texas law provided for joint managing conservatorship only upon
agreement of the parties,8 but now the legislature has enacted a statute that
enables a court to appoint joint managing conservators without such an
agreement. 9 This change necessitated numerous other changes such as the
* A.B., Oberlin College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Professor of Law, South-
ern Methodist University.
1. Title 2, Parent and Child, ch. 543, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1411.
2. E.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.021 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (appointment of joint
managing conservators).
3. E.g., id. § 12.06(a) (denial of paternity); see Davis v. Houston, 734 S.W.2d 210, 211
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ) (court denied husband's petition for writ of manda-
mus because legislature had already amended statute to allow wife to deny husband's
paternity).
4. E.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.05(a), (g), (h) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (child
support).
5. E.g., id. §§ 11.171 (b), (c) (corrected name of Department of Human Resources to
Department of Human Services); Id. § 14.44(d) (words such as petition changed to motion).
6. 725 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1987); for a discussion of the case, see infra notes 71-76 and
accompanying text.
7. See generally M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT (1978).
8. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.06(a) (Vernon 1986).
9. Id. § 14.01 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1988). It is interesting to note that this section in
subsection (a) validates what courts have been doing for some time: appointing grandparents
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need to define joint managing conservatorship,10 the need to spell out the
rights and duties of each of the joint managing conservators,I and the need
to define what must be included in the decree.' 2 In addition, it is necessary
to define the basis for a finding that a court-ordered joint managing conser-
vatorship is in the best interest of the child' 3 or when an agreed joint manag-
ing conservatorship is not in the best interest of the child.' 4 The legislature
also included provisions establishing the proper allocation of child support.' 5
The policy in favor of providing stability in children's lives' 6 has led to the
creation of a presumption that conservatorship decrees should not be reliti-
gated more often than annually.' 7 Joint conservatorships are likely to be
more difficult to maintain. Either internal or external circumstances may
quickly arise that could necessitate modification of the original decree. The
legislature recognized this possibility and provided that courts may modify
joint conservatorships at any time if certain specified conditions are met.' 8
If, however, a party tries to take advantage of these modification provisions
in order to harass the other party, a court may require the offending party to
pay attorney's fees. 19
In order to equalize the treatment of mothers and fathers of children born
out of wedlock20 and to recognize the scientific advances in blood tests used
to determine paternity, the legislature made a number of changes in Chapter
13, Determination of Paternity. If a father whose paternity is not in dispute
wishes to obtain an adjudication of his status as the legitimate parent of his
child, he must execute a statement of paternity.2' Then he, as the biological
father, may file a petition with the court for an adjudication that he is the
legitimate father of the child, and the court must enter the order. 22
A biological father's right to legitimate is not subject to a statute of limita-
tions.23 In addition, the legislature has amended the Probate Code again so
that a person claiming to be an illegitimate child or claiming inheritance
through an illegitimate child may, based on clear and convincing evidence,
as joint managing conservators. See Harrison v. Harrison, 734 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Tex. App.-
Eastland 1987, no writ); Garner v. Garner, 673 S.W.2d 413, 416-17 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1984, writ dism'd); Yancey v. Koonce, 645 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
10. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.021(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
11. Id. § 14.02(e).
12. Id. § 14.021(f).
13. Id. §§ 14.021(e), (h).
14. Id. §§ 14.021(c), (h).
15. Id. § 14.021(g).
16. See, e.g., Knowles v. Grimes, 437 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Tex. 1969) (court denied mother's
attempted relitigation of custody because material change of circumstances that would warrant
relitigation had not occurred).
17. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(d) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (modification of order).
18. Id. § 14.081(c)(1)(B). This section provides that the court may modify a decree if
"the decree has become unworkable or inappropriate under existing circumstances." Id.
19. Id. § 14.082 (addresses frivolous filing of Motion to Modify Conservatorship).
20. See In re McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1987).
21. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.22 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1988).
22. Id. § 13.21(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
23. Id. § 13.21(e).
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inherit from and through the purported father. 24 If the alleged father re-
mains in the pool of possible fathers after 95% of the male population has
been excluded by blood testing, a prima facie case of paternity has been
established. 25
The legislature, in the second called session, enacted a number of changes
in the method of enforcing child support orders. The most significant
change provides that an indigent respondent facing possible incarceration is
entitled to a court-appointed attorney, 26 and the attorney's fee is to be paid
out of county funds.27 The legislature clearly intends all of these procedures
to benefit the children whose support is at issue. This is spelled out in the
provision requiring bond forfeitures to be paid to the obligee rather than the
state.28 The legislature underscored this policy of support for children re-
gardless of their status by requiring courts to determine support amounts
without regard to the legitimacy of the child. 29
The above represents merely a sampling of the many changes enacted by
the seventieth legislative session. The State Bar Family Law Section Reports
discuss all of the statutory changes along with some legislative history.30
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
During the 1986-87 term the United States Supreme Court decided cases
in three important areas of parent and child law: paternity, custody, and
support. In Rivera v. Minnich 31 the Court held that the standard for a find-
ing of paternity requires merely a preponderance of the evidence. 32 The
Court reasoned that a paternity action involves a dispute between equals, the
mother and the alleged father, and each would suffer similarly as a result of
an adverse decision. 33 Thus each should share the risk of an inaccurate find-
ing.34 The Court did not agree with the father's contention that a finding of
paternity in which the only result adverse to the father is financial liability
for support of a child is the equivalent of a termination of the parent-child
relationship. 35 Accordingly, the standard of proof for each action may dif-
fer.36 The Court distinguished Santosky v. Kramer37 on the basis that when
24. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
25. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.06(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (regarding evidence at legiti-
mation trial).
26. Id. § 14.32(f).
27. Id. § 14.33(b).
28. Id. § 14.32(e).
29. Id. § 14.05(g).
30. Vol. 87-4 Legislation Edition, and Vol. 87-5 Legislation Edition, Part II.
31. 107 S. Ct. 3001, 97 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1987).
32. Id. at 3006, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 481. This resembles Texas law, which permits a finding of
paternity by the preponderance of the evidence after a court finds the alleged father not ex-
cluded by clear and convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.05 (Vernon 1986); See
In re J.A.K., 624 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
33. 107 S. Ct. at 3005, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 481.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 3004, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 480.
36. Id.
37. 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (in actions to terminate parental rights, state must support its
claim by clear and convincing standard).
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the state attempts to destroy an on-going relationship, as New York at-
tempted to do in Santosky, it should be held to a more demanding standard
of proof,38 while in paternity litigation the reverse holds true since such an
action attempts to establish a relationship. 39 The Court found that a major-
ity of the states agree with these differing standards of proof.4
In California v. Superior Court41 the Court addressed the problem of
child-snatching when courts in different states have entered various custody
orders, some of which might be valid. The mother in this case had, at the
time of divorce, obtained a California court decree giving her sole custody of
the children with visitation for the father. The mother remarried and moved
from California without notifying the father. The mother prevented the fa-
ther from visiting the children and while she resided in Texas obtained a
decree from a Texas court giving full faith and credit to the California de-
cree. In the meantime the father obtained a California decree that modified
the original decree and provided for joint custody. The California court is-
sued the decree prior to the Texas decree, but the mother did not notify the
Texas court of this fact. Because she also did not comply with the modified
California decree, the father applied again to the California court, which this
time awarded the father sole custody. In each instance all parties received
proper service and notice.
The mother continued to ignore the California court's orders and moved
to Louisiana, where the father found the children and, with the aid of his
father, took them back to California. The mother then instituted a criminal
kidnapping action against the father and grandfather by swearing out an
affidavit charging that they had acted without authority to remove the chil-
dren from her custody. With the affidavit as proof, Louisiana filed an infor-
mation charging the father and grandfather with violating Louisiana's
kidnapping statute.42 The Governor of Louisiana formally notified the Gov-
ernor of California that the State of Louisiana wanted the father and grand-
father for simple kidnapping and demanded that California deliver the men
for trial.43
The father and grandfather then petitioned the California Superior Court
for a writ of habeas corpus to circumvent the extradition warrants. The
court issued the writ based on a finding that the affidavits alone did not
establish the mother's right to her children. California authorities, acting on
behalf of Louisiana, then applied for a writ of mandate from the California
Court of Appeal, contending that the lower court had abused its discretion.
The appellate court reluctantly granted the writ. On appeal, the California
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and this appeal to the United
States Supreme Court followed.
The Court reversed on the basis that the extradition clause of the United
38. 107 S. Ct. at 3004, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 480.
39. Id. at 3003, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 478.
40. Id.
41. 107 S. Ct. 2433, 96 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1987).
42. Id. at 2436,96 L. Ed. 2d at 338 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:45.1 (West 1986)).
43. 107 S. Ct. at 2436, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 338.
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States Constitution44 and the Extradition Act4 5 require that extradition be a
summary procedure.46 The Court held that an extradition proceeding is not
the place to determine the underlying merits of the claims of the parties.
4 7
The Court apparently believed that the father had lawful custody of the chil-
dren according to the decrees of the California courts and that Louisiana
would probably so find 48 under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of
1980 (PKPA).49 The Court nevertheless held that Louisiana provided the
proper forum for justice under the Extradition Act.50
Justices Stevens and Brennan dissented based on their belief that the
Court's reading of the scope of review of an asylum state's judicial inquiry
was unnecessarily narrow. Furthermore they believed that this reading of
the Extradition Act undermined the goals and purposes of the PKPA.
52
Both sources of law embody "constitutional command[s]," and courts
should read them consistently with each other.53 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the Justices were concerned that the Court's holding would
provide estranged parents with an inappropriate weapon to use against each
other in custody battles. 54
Rose v. Rose 55 is a most important case in that it stands for the proposi-
tion that state child support orders based on veterans' benefits are not neces-
sarily preempted by federal law.56 In this case a Tennessee court ordered
Mr. Rose, a totally disabled veteran, to pay child support notwithstanding
the fact that he derived most of his income from federal veterans' benefits.
When he failed to pay he was held in contempt. He appealed, claiming that
the Veterans' Administration had exclusive jurisdiction over his benefits and
it had not apportioned them. The Court found this irrelevant since the Vet-
erans' Administration had not been involved in the state court child support
decision and since Congress had not spoken on this particular issue. 57 These
factors reduced the potential for interference with federal interests.5" The
Court also found that veterans' benefits are not paid to the veteran for his
support alone, but include support for his family, since the benefits consti-
44. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1982).
46. 107 S. Ct. at 2438, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 340. But see Ex parte Holden, 719 S.W.2d 678,
679-80 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no pet.) (court held that extradition presented question of
gubernatorial discretion). Holden is distinguishable because the alleged criminal acts occurred
in Texas, not in the demanding state. The applicant, therefore, was entitled to gubernatorial
discretion on the question of extradition.
47. 107 S. Ct. at 2440, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 343.
48. Id.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
50. 107 S. Ct. at 2441, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 343.
51. Id. at 2441, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 344.
52. Id. at 2445, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 348-49.
53. Id. at 2445, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 349.
54. Id. at 2446, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 350.
55. 107 S. Ct. 2029, 95 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1987).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2035, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 609.
58. Id. at 2036, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 610.
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tute compensation for impaired earning capacity.5 9 The funds are exempt
from garnishment or attachment while they are in the hands of the Veterans'
Administration, but following delivery to the veteran himself a state court
may require the veteran either to pay child support or be found in
contempt. 60
Last year's decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Veterans Administra-
tion v. Kee,6l in which the court held that a state court may not garnish a
father's disability benefits, 62 appears correct in light of Rose. It is, of course,
more certain as well as convenient to be able to order a federal agency to pay
child support monies directly to the obligee. Since this is not possible in the
case of veterans' benefits, the obligees should, on the basis of the holding in
Rose, be able to collect their child support arrearages through contempt
proceedings.
III. STATUS
In Howell v. State 63 the appellate court upheld the parents' conviction for
violating the compulsory school attendance law.64 The parents had ap-
peared pro se and contended that it was their religious conviction that their
children should be educated at home. At trial, however, they failed to show
the nature of their religious beliefs and practices. The appellate court held
that they had failed to show that the attendance law imposed a substantial
burden on the exercise of their religious beliefs and, therefore, did not reach
the question of the state's interest in educating minors.65
Another parent appearing pro se also ran into difficulties in Susan R.M v.
Northeast Independent School District.66 The court held that the father had
no standing since he had relinquished managing conservatorship to the
Texas Department of Human Services. 67 The case arose under the Educa-
tion of All Handicapped Children Act.68 The court pointed out that the
father might receive an appointment as next friend if the legal representa-
tive's interests conflicted with those of the infant, but the father must ask for
and obtain court approval to do so. 69
Fathers in Texas have had difficulty in establishing their right to
parenthood when their children have been born illegitimate and the mother
has objected to paternal involvement. 70 In In re McLean 7 1 the Texas
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2039, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 614.
61. 706 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. 1986).
62. Id. at 103.
63. 723 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no pet.).
64. Id. at 756 (parents held to have violated TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 4.25 (Vernon
1972 & Supp. 1988)).
65. 723 S.W.2d at 757-58.
66. 818 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1987).
67. Id. at 458.
68. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
69. 818 F.2d at 458.
70. See In re T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d 793, 797-98 (Tex. 1980).
71. 725 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1987).
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Supreme Court recognized that the Texas equal rights amendment 72 requires
courts to use strict scrutiny when examining gender-based discrimination. 7 3
The court held that procedures for voluntary legitimation as originally en-
acted violated the Texas Constitution. 74 A man who sought recognition as
the parent of his illegitimate child, over the mother's objection, had to prove
that it was in his child's best interest that the court recognize him as the
child's parent. 7" A mother, on the other hand is recognized as the child's
parent from birth.76 As a result of In re McLean the legislature changed the
statute.77 Of course, a court may terminate for cause the parent-child rela-
tionship of either the biological father or the mother.78 If a father has not
been found to be the biological father, but is merely the probable or alleged
father, the court may terminate his rights if he fails to respond to citation in
a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. 7
9
Married fathers have been able to deny paternity,8 0 but until the recent
change in the statute8' wives could not unilaterally challenge their husband's
parental status. Courts, in addition, have been reluctant to bastardize chil-
dren born during marriage.8 2 In re S.C. V 8 3 demonstrates the confusion cre-
ated by presumptions and the exclusion of scientific evidence. 84 The court
refused to admit the serologic evidence of the husband's nonpaternity and
instead ruled that since it could find no evidence of nonaccess by the hus-
band, the mother had not rebutted the presumption of legitimacy of a child
born during marriage.8 5 The court, therefore, held that the alleged father,
who was not the husband, was also not the father of the child, even though
the jury had found to the contrary.86 The husband was not a party to the
suit and, as the dissent pointed out, he could file a nonpaternity suit proving
his nonpaternity; the child would then have no legal father at all.87
Once a court has ruled in a divorce case that the former husband fathered
the children born during the marriage, setting aside that finding without the
consent of the mother is almost impossible. In Spears v. Haas,88 for exam-
ple, the court denied a writ of mandamus that would have compelled the
72. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a.
73. 725 S.W.2d at 698.
74. Id.
75. See Parent-Child Relationship Act, ch. 476, § 13.21, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 1263,
amended by Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 689, § 8, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 5100.
76. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.01 (Vernon 1986).
77. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
78. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.02, 15.024 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1988).
79. Id. § 15.023.
80. See Parent-Child Relationship Act, ch. 424, § 7, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws § 2355,
amended by Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 689, § 5, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 5099 (current version at
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.06 (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
81. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.06 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
82. Joplin v. Meadows, 623 S.W.2d 442, 463 (fex. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ)
(court recognized presumption of legitimacy accorded to births during wedlock).
83. 735 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ granted).
84. Id. at 876.
85. Id. at 878-79.
86. Id. at 875, 877.
87. Id. at 880.
88. 718 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
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former wife-mother to submit to serologic testing to determine paternity.8 9
The husband attempted to overturn the original paternity finding by way of
a bill of review, and the court held that he had to establish a prima facie case
before he could ask that the wife undergo serology testing.90 He had had a
vasectomy two years prior to the birth of his twins. He must, therefore, have
known at the time of his divorce of the basis for contesting paternity. 9 Had
the husband contested paternity at the time of divorce, then the serologic
evidence would have been admitted. If the evidence was clear and convinc-
ing that the husband was excluded from paternity, then the court would
have had to have found that he was not the father.92
Collier v. Wichita County Child Welfare Unit93 involved an alleged fa-
ther's attempted legitimation of two children born prior to marriage, and
one during another marriage; the court dismissed the claim. Problems arose
as a result of a suit brought by the Wichita County Child Welfare Unit to
terminate the parent-child relationship. The biological father counter-
claimed in that suit to legitimate his two children. The court held that the
child born between marriages was the legitimate child of the father despite
the fact that a court later annulled the marriage and the father had declared
under oath that there were no children born during the marriage. 94 The
court in Collier went on to hold that the older child who was born during an
earlier marriage of the mother was a legitimate child of that earlier marriage
and, therefore, the biological father could not voluntarily legitimate that
child. 95 The dissent claimed that the court had engaged in too technical a
reading of the father's petition and would have reversed and remanded the
case.
96
After a paternity suit brought by the state has been dismissed with preju-
dice because of the noncooperation of the mother, the child cannot appeal
the judgment since the child was not a party to the original suit.97 If a court
entered summary judgment in a paternity suit under the old one-year statute
of limitations,9" based on a limitations defense, a second suit will be barred
based on the doctrine of res judicata.99 The Dallas appeals court that found
a subsequent suit barred noted that the child had not been a party to either
suit.I10 This result is unfortunate because the United States Supreme Court
89. Id. at 758.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See W.K. v. M.H.K., 719 S.W.2d 232, 234, 236 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (when father establishes absence of biological fatherhood by clear and
convincing evidence, court must proceed to find absence of paternity).
93. 722 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
94. Id. at 200 (court relied on statutory presumption of legitimation in TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 12.02(a) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1988)).
95. 722 S.W.2d at 201.
96. Id. at 202.
97. See Stroud v. Stroud, 733 S.W.2d 619, 621, 622 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
98. Parent-Child Relationship Act, ch. 476, § 13.01, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 1261, 1261-62,
amended by, Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 744, § 13.01, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4531; see TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon 1986).
99. Fite v. King, 718 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
100. Id. at 346 n.1.
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found the original limitations statute unconstitutional °10 and the legislature
changed the statute by lengthening the limitations period to twenty years
from the date of birth. 10 2 The Fite case addressed by the Dallas court
presented an especially good fact situation for applying the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, which permits exceptions to the rule of res judicata
when the judgment in the first action was plainly inconsistent with the im-
plementation of a later statutory scheme or constitutional holding. 0 3
A child must establish paternity in order to collect worker's compensa-
tion,' ° 4 bring a wrongful death action, 0 5 or obtain social security bene-
fits.' 0 6 In order to contest a will it is not necessary to establish paternity; a
justiciable interest is sufficient. 10 7 In Seyffert v. Briggs,10 8 however, the
plaintiff contended that she was the illegitimate child of the decedent and
therefore entitled to act as the administratrix of the estate. She based her
claim on the statute permitting the use of written statements made by her
alleged father before 1974.109 The court held that these statements could be
used in a paternity action, but not in a probate action, since the Probate
Code 0 in effect at the time only recognized legitimate children or illegiti-
mate children whose fathers had executed statements of paternity in accord-
ance with the Family Code."' Accordingly, the appellate court dismissed
the cause without prejudice. 12 If, however, the heirs can demonstrate that
their ancestor was a natural child of the decedent, they may still inherit from
the decedent, if they can show that they have been disinherited because of an
old, unconstitutional statute." 3
The attorney general has ruled that a child receiving death benefits, be-
cause of the death of a parent, under the state statute for children of fire and
101. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 97, 100 (1982) (statute violated equal protection).
102. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(l)(d) (1982); see id. § 26(1)(d) com-
ment e, illustration 6.
104. Leal v. Moreno, 733 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ)
(paternity could be conclusively disproved by use of properly administered blood tests).
105. See Cook v. Winters, 645 F. Supp. 158, 159-60 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (court abstained
based on federal domestic relations exception as well as holding that child was not decedent's
natural or legal child based on finding in prior Texas divorce decree).
106. See Morris v. Bowen, 646 F. Supp. 363, 365-66 (W.D. Tex. 1986). The court found
that the child was not the decedent's natural or legal child and that under Texas law there was
no clear or convincing evidence of an agreement to adopt; the child, therefore, was not the
decedent's equitably adopted child. Id. at 366.
107. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 10 (Vernon 1980).
108. 727 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
109. Id. at 627 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.24 (Vernon 1986)).
110. See Probate Revision Act, ch. 713, § 5, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1743, amended by Act of
June 17, 1987, ch. 464, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 4085, 4085-86 (current version at TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 12(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988)); see also supra note 24 and accompanying
text (discusses amended Probate Code).
111. 727 S.W.2d at 628. The court required that the statement meet the requirements of
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.22 (Vernon 1986).
112. 727 S.W.2d at 628.
113. Stafford v. Little, 730 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, no writ). The court
rested its decision on the holding in Reed v. Campbell, 106 S. Ct. 2234, 2238, 90 L. Ed. 2d 858,
864 (1986) (Court ordered reversal of judgment based on unconstitutional disinheritance stat-
ute). Stafford, 730 S.W.2d at 163.
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law enforcement officers who had suffered violent deaths in the course of
duty, 114 may continue to do so even after adoption. 115 If, however, the child
was adopted by another before the death of the natural parent, the child may
not receive benefits under the statute.' 1 6
IV. CONSERVATORSHIP
In order to determine custody of a child the court must have jurisdiction,
and if the court enters an order without proper notice to the parent of the
child, that order is void.' 17 A court may not enter a default judgment with-
out the ten-day notice required for contested cases when the defendant has
entered an appearance." 8 If a party has filed a petition for custody in an-
other state prior to the petition in the Texas court, and the petition in the
other state conforms with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA), 1 9 then the Texas court has no subject matter jurisdiction and
must not act.' 20 After a nonsuit has been entered in a divorce case, a court
may issue temporary orders with regard to the custody of the children, but
these orders are interlocutory in nature and are eliminated when another
court takes jurisdiction of the divorce.12 1
In Gay v. Gay 122 the court by some very specious reasoning held that the
trial court did not commit reversible error by deciding custody on the basis
of the sex of the child.' 23 The trial court had stated "that a three-year old
girl is a different matter from a three-year old boy" and, therefore, to ap-
point the mother the managing conservator promoted the best interest of the
child. ' 24 The appellate court recognized that the Family Code prohibits the
use of gender as a basis for determining the qualifications of parents 125 and
that prior case law has held that such reasoning constitutes reversible er-
ror. ' 26 The court, however, distinguished these authorities by finding that in
this case the trial judge focused on the sex of the child and its best interest
114. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6228f, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
115. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-731 (1987).
116. Id.
117. Rider v. Farris, 718 S.W.2d 883, 884 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ dism'd). The
conservators provided notice by publication and the court entered the judgment after only 16
days' notice to the mother, instead of the proper 20 days required by statute. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 11.09(e) (Vernon 1986).
118. Schulz v. Schulz, 726 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ) (court re-
vised trial court's default order because wife had not received proper notice in divorce and
conservatorship contest).
119. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.51-.75 (Vernon 1986).
120. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 719 S.W.2d 224, 227, 229 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986,
writ dism'd).
121. Ault v. Mulanax, 724 S.W.2d 824, 831-32 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no writ)
(new divorce court must include conservatorship issues in its hearings and judgment).
122. 737 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ denied).
123. Id. at 95.
124. Id.
125. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (prohibits consid-
eration of parents' sex).
126. 737 S.W.2d at 95 (citing Glud v. Glud, 641 S.W.2d 688, 690-91 (Tex. App.-Waco
1982, no writ) (court reversed child custody order based on consideration of parent's sex)).
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rather than the sex of the parents.' 27
The court has discretion to appoint a guardian ad litem in custody
suits.128 Even if the court appoints a guardian, the guardian need not appear
at trial when the judge has determined that the guardian can add nothing
further to the background of the case. 129 When grandparents intervene in a
divorce and custody suit, the grandparents, in order to be appointed manag-
ing conservators of the child, must prove that their appointment would be in
the best interest of the child. 130 They need not prove that the parents would
endanger or emotionally harm the child.'31
When both parents meet the necessary qualifications for managing conser-
vatorship, the court does not abuse its discretion by entering judgment for
the father on the jury verdict, since it would not contradict the weight of the
evidence.' 32 In Parker v. Parker 133 the father stated unequivocally that the
child was his, and the mother offered no evidence controverting that state-
ment. As a result, the court held that the trial court had not abused its
discretion by appointing the father the managing conservator even though
the child was born after only three weeks of marriage.134 The mother also
complained that the lower court had incorrectly overruled her motions to
disqualify the father's initial attorney at trial. The court found that this did
not constitute error because although the attorney had previously repre-
sented the mother in a different custody dispute, the attorney voluntarily
withdrew after the mother filed disqualification motions.' 35 In addition, the
mother failed to show that she suffered prejudice during the trial. 136 The
court held that based on the evidence adduced at trial it was in the best
interest of the child to appoint the father the managing conservator. 137 The
court in In re Yarbrough 138 also appointed the father managing conservator
despite the mother's claims of jury misconduct and perjury on the part of the
father. 139 The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion by refusing to order a new trial on the basis of newly discovered
127. 737 S.W.2d at 96.
128. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.10(a) (Vernon 1986).
129. Lopez v. Lopez, 723 S.W.2d 772, 773 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, no writ) (court
awarded managing conservatorship of children to mother).
130. Harrison v. Harrison, 734 S.W.2d 737, 740-41 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1987, no writ)
(court distinguished between proof required of intervenors in suit that has already been
brought under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03(a) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1988) and burden of
proof required of filers of original suit under id.. § 11.03(b)).
131. Id.
132. Kotrla v. Kotrla, 718 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (conservatorship awarded to father although mother was granted "broad" visitation
rights, but this did not mean that she was best suited to be managing conservator); Garza v.
Garza, 718 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ) (conservatorship
awarded to father since it was not shown that admission of evidence of rumors that mother
was having an illicit affair resulted in improper jury verdict).
133. 720 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1986, no writ).
134. Id. at 115.
135. Id. at 116.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 719 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ).
139. Id. at 413.
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evidence when that evidence did not show that the custody order would
severely harm the children.14o
In re Knighton 141 is a particularly egregious case since the question of
managing conservatorship has been in continuous litigation since 1982. The
mother belongs to the Worldwide Church of God and during both trials the
father's primary attack on her capacity to be managing conservator of the
children focused on her religious beliefs. The court of appeals remanded the
case originally in 1984 because of improper comments in the jury charge
with respect to the mother's religious beliefs. 142 On remand, a large portion
of the interrogation of the parties centered on religion.' 43 The court re-
versed and remanded, again finding that instead of a trial on the issue of the
best interest of the child, the proceedings were actually a trial of the
mother's religious beliefs. 44 The court held that the error rose to funda-
mental, constitutional dimension and that the mother did not waive the er-
ror by failing to object or by withdrawing a motion for a mistrial.145 The
court did not, however, change the temporary managing conservatorship of
the father, which had been in effect since 1982.146
In In re Rutland the court overruled a similar plea. 147 The court removed
the mother, a Jehovah's Witness, as the managing conservator and ap-
pointed the father in her stead.' 48 The court specifically refused to follow
Knighton and held that the mother's failure to object to the introduction of
her religious beliefs waived any error.' 49 The court found sufficient evidence
to support a finding that retention of the mother as managing conservator
would injure the children and that appointment of the father as managing
conservator would be a positive improvement.150
In all civil cases, even modification suits, a record should be made unless it
has been waived by the parties.' 5' A temporary order entered prior to a
hearing on the merits of a motion to modify is interlocutory and not appeala-
ble. 5 2 If a child has lived for six months in a county other than the one in
which the court entered the original conservatorship order, the court should
transfer the cause to the county where the child lives, even if an intervenor
140. Id. at 415, 417.
141. 723 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, no writ).
142. In re Knighton, 685 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ).
143. 723 S.W.2d at 278-79.
144. Id. at 285.
145. Id. at 283, 284.
146. Id. at 285.
147. 729 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
148. Id. at 932.
149. Id. at 931, 932.
150. Id. at 935, 936. In McWilliams v. McWilliams, 804 F.2d 1400, 1403 (5th Cir. 1986),
the Fifth Circuit sustained the trial court's dismissal of the case under the doctrine of claim
preclusion. The court found that this was a child custody case brought because of an alleged
violation of the mother's first amendment religious rights. Id. at 1402. The court held that the
issue had not been raised in the Texas court, there had been no appeal from the original judg-
ment, and therefore, the judgment was final. Id. at 1403.
151. Patterson v. Permenter, 721 S.W.2d 479, 480 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ).
152. Cobb v. Musslewhite, 728 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, no writ).
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has made the motion.15 3 A court may reverse a default judgment if it cannot
find evidence to support the allegations.' 54 In any event, "[clourts should
exercise liberality"' 55 in favor of permitting a defaulting party access to the
courts, especially in suits affecting the parent-child relationship. 156 Failure
to grant a new trial when a meritorious defense exists is an abuse of
discretion. 57
In order to obtain a modification of a conservatorship order, the petitioner
must demonstrate a material change in circumstances and that "retention of
the present sole managing conservator would be injurious [and]... appoint-
ment of a new managing conservator would be a positive improve-
ment .... -158 In Parsons v. Parsons 159 the court upheld an order, supported
by a jury verdict, changing the managing conservatorship from the mother
to the father. 160 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to
admit videotaped testimony of the minor child into evidence.16' Magers v.
Durham 162 also involved allegations of sexual abuse, but the court sustained
the jury verdict permitting the mother to remain as managing conservator,
holding that the court could not substitute its conclusions for those of the
jury. 163
Parties should exercise caution before attempting to change a joint manag-
ing conservatorship to a sole managing conservatorship. In Roach v.
Roach 164 the father filed a motion asking to change the order from joint
managing conservatorship to one appointing him as sole managing conserva-
tor. He alleged in his pleadings that the joint managing conservatorship in-
jured the children. The jury found that retaining the mother as joint
managing conservator was injurious, but that appointment of her as sole
managing conservative would provide a positive improvement. 165 The court
found that the jury findings did not conflict, since the jury understood that
the parties had acted as joint managing conservators.' 66 The court also
found that the mother did not have to introduce evidence on the injurious-
ness of the joint managing conservatorship since the father had already done
153. Walker v. Miller, 729 S.W.2d 120, 122-23 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ). In this
case the child had been living for more than a year with its grandparents with the consent of
the managing conservator. The grandparents did not live in Dallas County, and when the
father moved to modify they intervened and petitioned the court to transfer the proceeding to
the county where the child lived. The grandparents sought appointment as joint managing
conservators or possessory conservators. Id. at 122.
154. Considine v. Considine, 726 S.W.2d 253, 254 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
155. Sexton v. Sexton, 737 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 133, 134.
•158. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
159. 722 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
160. Id. at 755.
161. Id. at 754.
162. 720 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ dism'd).
163. Id. at 873.
164. 735 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
165. Id. at 484.




To litigate the enforcement or modification of custody orders in Texas a
party must effectively show that the Texas courts have jurisdiction. For ex-
ample, in Clague v. Clague 168 the court held that Texas did not have juris-
diction to modify a Texas decree because of the children's absence from the
state for four years. 169 When the child has a home state other than Texas
the courts cannot take jurisdiction based only on a spurious finding of an
emergency that allegedly raises serious questions concerning the child's wel-
fare. 170 Texas courts will also recognize a valid Mexican court order and
limit permissible relief to a temporary short-term protective order pending
final determination by the Mexican court. 171
The court in Hutchings v. Biery 172 apparently believed that the jurisdic-
tion rules concerning interstate custody do not include visitation and so ap-
plied the Texas continuing jurisdiction rules 173 instead of the UCCJA. 17 4
The definition of custody determination in the UCCJA specifically includes
visitation. 175 The definitions also refer to Texas terminology as to "custody"
meaning managing conservatorship 176 and "visitation" meaning posses-
sion, 177 but this does not mean that the jurisdictional rules exclude visitation
since it is the custody determination that is at issue. 178 The court in Hutch-
ings did hold that the Maryland resident had sufficient contacts with Texas
so that the exercise of jurisdiction over him to modify visitation did not of-
fend due process, 179 but that is irrelevant since the court had no jurisdiction
under the UCCJA.180
Frustration with the inability of one party to persuade the other party to
obey custody orders has given rise to an increasing amount of penalizing
litigation, but before a person may be confined for failing to comply with a
167. Id. The court pointed out that the decision was difficult because the jury had to
choose between two good parents who loved the children and had made sacrifices in order to
give them a good life. Id. at 484.
168. 723 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, no writ).
169. Id. at 810; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.53(d) (Vernon 1986).
170. Ex parte McDonald, 737 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ)
(father was granted habeas corpus after being found in contempt for violating a court order
that court had no jurisdiction to enter); Milner v. Kilgore, 718 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1986, no writ) (mother attempted to recover her child from father based on a
valid prior court order; writ of habeas corpus should have issued as automatic ministerial act);
Grimes v. Flores, 717 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ) (court granted
mother's writ of mandamus in habeas corpus action to obtain return of her children; mother
had already shown that court had no jurisdiction over children for purposes of determining
custody, Grimes v. Grimes, 706 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ
dism'd)).
171. Garza v. Harney, 726 S.W.2d 198, 203 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, no writ).
172. 723 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
173. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.05 (Vernon 1986).
174. Id. §§ 11.51-.75.
175. Id. § 11.52(2).
176. Id. § 11.52(10).
177. Id. § 11.52(11).
178. Id. § 11.53.
179. 723 S.W.2d at 349.
180. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.53(d) (Vernon 1986).
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visitation order there must be notice and a hearing.181 The Texas Supreme
Court in Silcott v. Oglesby ,82 ruled that at common law and now by stat-
ute18 3 a person has the right to obtain damages for the retention of a child in
violation of a court order.18 4 Accordingly, upon remand by the supreme
court the lower court found that the facts sufficiently showed that the mater-
nal grandfather had taken or retained possession of the child in violation of a
valid court order, thereby entitling the managing conservator to recover ac-
tual and exemplary damages.' 85
In Smith v. Smith 186 the court sustained a jury award of $53 million
against a number of related defendants for violating the child custody inter-
ference statute. 187 If the thought of a $53 million judgment does not deter
persons from violating court orders, then perhaps criminal penalties will. In
Perry v. State ' 88 a mother was convicted of interference with child custody
and sentenced to a two-year prison term, which the court probated.8 9 In
Davis v. State 190 a father was convicted of enticing a child, assessed a $1000
fine, and sentenced to 180 days in jail. 191 He broke into the mother's house
and took the child at a time when he was not entitled to possession.' 92
V. SUPPORT
The child support guidelines that became effective February 4, 1987, and
the court order form promulgated by the attorney general for orders with-
holding from earnings for child support have been published in the Family
Code. 9 3 In Rafidi v. Rafidi, 194 decided before the guidelines became effec-
tive, the court upheld an award of $800 a month in child support. 195 In
Jackson v. Crawford,19 6 another pre-guideline case, the court upheld an
award of $500 a month in child support and ordered withholding of earnings
to pay the award. 19 7 The court found that this was not a modification situa-
tion, but an original decree since although the petition had been styled as a
181. Ex parte Mackie, 727 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
182. 721 S.W.2d 290 (fex. 1986).
183. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.01-.08 (Vernon 1986).
184. 721 S.W.2d at 293-94.
185. Oglesby v. Silcott, 728 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, no writ).
186. 720 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
187. Id. at 596, 600 (defendants violated TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 36.02 (Vernon 1986)).
188. 727 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no pet.).
189. 727 S.W.2d at 781 (mother violated TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.03(a)(1) (Vernon
Supp. 1988)).
190. 736 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.).
191. Id. at 218.
192. Id. Winthrop v. State, 735 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987,
pet. ref'd), is another case in which a defendant was convicted of violating § 25.04 of the Texas
Penal Code. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.04 (Vernon 1974).
193. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (child support guidelines);
Id. § 14.42 (form of order).
194. 718 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no pet.).
195. Id. at 46.
196. 727 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
197. Id. at 631, 633.
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motion to modify, no court had entered prior support orders.198
When a court faces a number of issues, but the court has only dealt with
one of them, any order entered regarding that issue is not a final appealable
order, and an appellate court has no jurisdiction.1 99 The court, however,
should grant a motion to transfer as it is the court's "mandatory ministerial
duty" when the child has resided in the transferee county for more than six
months. 2°° Because remedy by appeal frequently fails to protect the rights
of parents and children, appellate courts will grant mandamus to compel
transfer in the proper case. 20 1 A Texas court may increase an out-of-state
child support order in a default judgment if the other state's judgment has
been properly authenticated and the payor has not objected to the evidence
in the writ of error petition.20 2 If there is no prior order fixing payment, a
court cannot order a father to pay arrearages, since there are none, but the
court may order him to pay increased future child support.20 3 An ambigu-
ous, indefinite child support order will not support a judgment for back child
support. 2°4 A definite order can be reduced to judgment, but only for pay-
ments due and owing for ten years or less.20 5
A court may increase, 20 6 decrease, 20 7 or refrain from changing the
amount of a child support order even though either an increase20 8 or a de-
198. Id. at 633.
199. Zellers v. Barthel, 727 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ) (order
appealed from was for increase in child support).
200. Proffer v. Yates, 734 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. 1987) (recognizing TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 11.06(b), (i) (Vernon 1986)).
201. See Proffer, 734 S.W.2d at 673 (granted conditional writ of mandamus after court of
appeals, Proffer v. Yates, 723 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987), had refused to
grant one).
202. Farley v. Farley, 731 S.W.2d 733, 736-37 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ). A for-
mer wife sought to modify a California decree that was nonmodifiable unless the husband's net
annual income exceeded $15,000. The former wife introduced Internal Revenue Service 1099
forms and employer's earnings reports as evidence of the husband's income. Although the
evidence constituted hearsay, the husband failed to complain that the trial court erred in ad-
mitting the documents. Id.
203. McLeod v. McLeod, 723 S.W.2d 777, 779, 780 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
204. Templet v. Templet, 728 S.W.2d 844, 847-48 (rex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ).
Such a decree is also unenforceable by contempt. See Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43, 44-45
(rex. 1967).
205. See Sandford v. Sandford, 732 S.W.2d 449, 450-51 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ)
(court modified trial judgment for child support based on TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.41(b)
(Vernon Supp. 1988)).
206. See Sohocki v. Sohocki, 730 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ)
(court awarded requested increase in support to $4000 a month for both children and $3000
for younger child after elder's emancipation; father had net monthly income of $40,000, while
mother earned $500 per month); Power v. Power, 720 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex. App.-Houston
[Ist Dist.] 1986, writ dism'd) (court increased support from $375 per month to $900). In
Power the father tried to enter a plea in abatement under the Soldier's and Sailor's Relief Act,
50 U.S.C. § 521 (1982), but the court found no evidence that his defense was adversely affected
by his military service. 720 S.W.2d at 685.
207. Trahan v. Trahan, 732 S.W.2d 113, 114-15 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ)
(court reduced support payments by $60 a month after father's income had declined $46).
208. Baker v. Baker, 719 S.W.2d 672, 675-76 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ). The
mother asked for more support, but did not prove that her income had decreased or that the
father's income had increased. The court specifically did not rely on the father's increased
expenses caused by his remarriage and his two additional children. Id. at 675. The court also
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crease 20 9 has been requested. A court cannot order child support after the
child reaches eighteen since the court loses jurisdiction at that time.210 An
agreed order, even one entered early on, to support the children through
college, is not a contract unless the agreement expressly provides that the
terms are enforceable as a contract. 211 Income from a spendthrift trust may
be attached to satisfy a judgment for arrearages in child support even after
the child attains eighteen years.212 When a child marries, the parents' duty
of support generally terminates. 21 3 If, however, the marriage of the minor is
annulled, the support duty may revive based on the idea that an annulment
voids a marriage ab initio.214 The result may differ when the minor child
marries and then divorces since a marriage did in fact exist and the minor
child remains emancipated. 21 5
Enforcement of child support orders may be achieved by any of three
methods: contempt, 21 6 judgment for arrearages, 21 7 and withholding from
earnings. 218 When withholding from the obligee's wages becomes a stan-
dard practice, use of the first two remedies may decline. For example, in
Taylor v. Taylor21 9 the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision not
to order withholding from the obligor's wages. 220 The trial court declined to
order withholding because he was classified as a temporary employee. 221
The appellate court pointed out that the Family Code provides for penalties
against an employer who uses an income withholding order to terminate an
employee and the Code does not distinguish between temporary and perma-
reversed the order on income withholding, since the father was not in arrears and there had
been no motion requesting it. Id. at 677.
209. Powell v. Powell, 721 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ)
(father asked for reduction in light of changed circumstances; court denied it based on his
aggregate resources and earning potential).
210. Couser v. Stanton, 722 S.W.2d 250, 251 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ);
Fullerton v. Holliman, 721 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, writ dism'd). Later,
in Fullerton v. Holliman, 730 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.), how-
ever, the court reversed and rendered the earlier denial of the order because it found the sup-
port was based on a contract between the parents. Id. at 170. These cases arise because the
legislature changed the duty of support to include children who, although they are past 18, are
fully enrolled in a program leading to a high school diploma. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 14.05(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
211. Elfeldt v. Elfeldt, 730 S.W.2d 657-58 (Tex. 1987), rev'g 725 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. App.-
Houston [Ist Dist.] 1986) (based on TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.06(d) (Vernon 1986)).
212. First City Nat'l Bank v. Phelan, 718 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
213. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(d) (Vernon 1986).
214. Fernandez v. Fernandez, 717 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, writ
dism'd).
215. Laird v. Swor, 737 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ) (duty of
support ordered for daughter). The court, however, did hold that a child who goes to live with
an aged relative is not emancipated and therefore the duty of support for that child continues.
Id.
216. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.40 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1988).
217. Id. § 14.42.
218. Id. § 14.43.
219. 721 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).





In Ex parte McIntyre223 the San Antonio appellate court wrestled with
the problem of what process is due to a contemnor in a child support hear-
ing. The court held that a court should advise all contemnors who appear
pro se of their right to counsel so that the record will establish that the
contemnor knew of his right to representation and waived it.224 The court
then specifically overruled Ex parte Lopez 2 2 5 as to the respondent's burden
when he or she replies to a motion for contempt for failure to pay child
support.226 The court held that the respondent has the burden to establish,
by a preponderance of the evidence, the defense of involuntary inability to
pay.227 The majority did not discuss Lowry v. State,228 but the dissent saw
no distinction between a civil contempt hearing and a criminal nonsupport
proceeding and argued that the burden of persuasion should not shift on the
basis of convenience. 229 The majority held that the movant had made out a
prima facie case of contempt for failure to make child support payments and
denied the writ of habeas corpus.230 Courts, however, granted the writs in
other cases in which the relator showed that he had not been informed of his
right to counsel,231 or that he could not afford an attorney and had not been
provided one. 232
Writs of habeas corpus based on findings of contempt for failure to pay
child support were denied in a number of cases despite allegations: (1) that
an appeal was pending,233 (2) that it was really an imprisonment for debt
because the amount owing had been reduced to judgment, 234 (3) that the
order was not sufficiently specific to be enforceable by contempt, 2 35 or
(4) that the contemnor was unable to pay. 236 Habeas corpus will issue if an
222. Id. at 458 (discussing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.43(m), (n) (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
223. 730 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
224. Id. at 415.
225. 710 S.W.2d 948, 956 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
226. 730 S.W.2d at 417.
227. Id.
228. 692 S.W.2d 86, 87-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (portion of criminal nonsupport sec-
tions of criminal code unconstitutional).
229. 730 S.W.2d at 422, 425.
230. Id. at 419.
231. Ex parte Simpson, 736 S.W.2d 939, 940 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ); Ex
parte Young, 724 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ).
232. Ex parte Strickland, 724 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1987, no writ); Ex
parte Hamill, 718 S.W.2d 78, 79 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ). The legislature has
resolved these problems. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
233. See Sullivan v. Sullivan, 719 S.W.2d 239, 240 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ) (trial
court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce its child support order even during pendency of
appeal from that order).
234. Exparte Wilbanks, 722 S.W.2d 221, 224 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ) (father
was in contempt for failing to pay child support, not for failing to pay judgment; child support
is not a debt, but a duty).
235. Exparte Jimenez, 737 S.W.2d 358, 361 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ); Ex
parte Conoly, 732 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ); Ex parte Parrott, 723
S.W.2d 342, 343-44 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
236. Ex parte Dabau, 732 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, no writ); Ex parte
Carruth, 731 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ); Ex parte Sustrik, 721
S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
[Vol. 42
FAMILY LAW. PARENT AND CHILD
order of commitment is not in writing,237 or was entered by a court that
lacked jurisdiction because the case had been transferred to another
county. 238 A contempt order must be specific, 23 9 must be based on the alle-
gations in the pleadings, 24° and must give notice of which judgment the con-
temnor has violated 241 before it will support a commitment. Of course, if
the father really can prove that he lacks the ability to pay because of indi-
gency the court will order his discharge from custody.24 2
The Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(RURESA)24 3 has replaced the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act (URESA).244 Because it became effective on November 1, 1987,
the courts have not yet tested the provisions. An appellate court, applying
the former Act, recognized that venue lies in the county of the residence of
the obligee.24 5 Additionally, in Whitehead v. Whitehead 24 6 an appellate
court also applying the old Act held that the receiving court may upwardly
modify a prior support order. 24 7
VI. TERMINATION AND ADOPTION
The Texas Supreme Court in Texas Department of Human Services v.
Boyd 24 8 defined the word endanger as used in the Texas Family Code2 4 9 in
connection with the involuntary termination of parental rights. The court
held that endanger does not mean the same thing as danger, which a court
defined as "actual and concrete threat of injury to the child's emotional or
physical well-being."' 25 0 Endanger means to "expose to loss or injury; to
jeopardize" and in this context the court does not need to find that the "con-
duct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury. ' 25 1 The
court held that imprisonment standing alone would not constitute endanger-
ment, but that if the evidence, including evidence of imprisonment, demon-
strates a pattern of conduct that endangers a child, then a decree terminating
237. Ex parte Strickland, 723 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Tex. 1987).
238. Ex parte Serenil, 734 S.W.2d 71, 73-74 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
239. Exparte Hernandez, 726 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1987, no writ).
240. Ex parte Stephens, 734 S.W.2d 761, 763-64 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ)
(court held that failure to "timely" pay is not same as failure to pay child support).
241. Exparte Rosborough, 723 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no
writ) (order that lacked notice of charge and judgment was void).
242. Ex parte Barnes, 730 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, writ dism'd).
243. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 21.01-.34 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
244. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, ch. 543, § 3, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws
1458, 1463, repealed by Act of Aug. 3, 1987, ch. 49, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 291, 291-319.
245. Gaston v. Chaney, 734 S.W.2d 735, 737 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1987, no writ).
246. 735 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, no writ).
247. Id. at 536.
248. 727 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. 1987), rev'g and remanding 715 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App.-Aus-
tin 1986).
249. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(l)(E) (Vernon 1986).
250. 727 S.W.2d at 533 (emphasis in original).
251. Id. This definition is a less specific ground for termination of parental rights than that
suggested by some noted authorities. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 72 (1979).
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the parent-child relationship is supportable. 252
In In re SH.A. 253 the Dallas court of civil appeals concluded, similarly to
Boyd, that the Family Code does not require a court to find that aggressive
or abusive behavior was directed at the child before a court may terminate
the parent-child relationship.254 The court then went on to specifically over-
rule Higgins v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit255 to the extent that it
conflicted with S.HA. 25 6 S.HA. was a very difficult case involving the ter-
mination of parental rights in respect to only one child of a family with six
children, based on conflicting evidence and witnesses.257 The dissenters be-
lieved that the trial court based the termination on the parents' poverty and
ignorance 258 and that the majority created the opportunity for courts to ter-
minate parental rights based solely on the parents' unknowing, ignorant, and
passive neglect of the child.259
To support the termination of the parent-child relationship the claimant
must provide clear and convincing evidence.260 In E.L.B. v. Texas Depart-
ment of Human Services261 the court agreed that the claimant had satisfied
this burden and found that while the mother had a mental capacity of an
eight-year old child, the court could not assume that she was incapable of
realizing that she was neglecting her children. 262 In Juan A. v. Dallas
County Child Welfare263 the court also held that clear and convincing evi-
dence supported the termination of parental rights because of the mother's
failure to take the child for treatment after he had been severely burned
while under the care of his father.264 The Corpus Christi appeals court up-
held another parent-child relationship termination despite a claim that the
trial court had lost jurisdiction after failing to timely hold a hearing to re-
view the placement of the child. 265 The court held that loss of jurisdiction
would constitute an excessive remedy for failing to meet the statutory
252. 727 S.W.2d at 534. The court in In re A.K.S., 736 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 1987, no writ), followed Boyd in affirming the termination of a father's parental rights
based on his conviction for rape of a stranger and a compulsion to expose his genitals to
women. Id. at 146.
253. 728 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
254. Id. at 83 (discussing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(1)(E) (Vernon 1986)).
255. 544 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
256. 728 S.W.2d at 83.
257. Id. at 75-81.
258. Id. at 94.
259. Id. at 102.
260. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.15(b) (Vernon 1986).
261. 732 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
262. Id. at 787.
263. 726 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ) (case appealed after abatement of
initial appeal, Juan A. v. Dallas County Child Welfare, 733 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1986, no writ), to permit specific findings, because the findings had originally been written in
alternative).
264. 726 S.W.2d at 244.
265. Garcia v. Tex. Dep't of Human Servs., 721 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex. App.--Corpus
Christi 1986, no writ). The court applied TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 18.01(c) (Vernon Supp.
1988), which requires that hearings be held no earlier than five and one-half months and no
later than seven months from the date of the last hearing. Id.
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deadlines.266
The Texas Department of Human Services has tried to base the termina-
tion of the parent-child relationship on the fact that allowing a child to re-
main in its foster care negatively affects the child and, therefore, endangers
the child. The court of appeals in G.M. v. Texas Department of Human
Resources267 found this position untenable and without merit.2 68 In Rodri-
guez v. Texas Department of Human Services269 the court also held that
there was insufficient evidence to support termination of parental rights and
that the provision for allowing judges to interview minor children in cham-
bers cannot be used in proceedings to terminate the parent-child relation-
ship.270 The provision for interviewing minors is found in and relates to
Family Code sections regarding proceedings for conservatorship. 271
In Perez v. Williamson 272 the court reversed and remanded a private ter-
mination and adoption decree because the parties seeking to adopt the child
(appellees) lacked standing.273 The court came to this conclusion based on a
strict reading of the statute that required the appellees to have maintained
possession and control of the child for at least six months immediately prior
to the filing of the suit. 274 The child had been removed from the appellees'
home and placed with the Harris County Court Services shortly before the
appellees filed this suit. Additionally, the appellees had retained control of
the child in defiance of court orders. A concurrence pointed out that the
better way to have resolved the issue would have been to have given full faith
and credit to a Mississippi decree that had upheld the natural mother's right
to custody of the child. 275 Even a suit to terminate the parent-child relation-
ship is subject to the mandatory transfer provisions regarding consolida-
tion.276 A court must transfer a suit affecting the parent-child relationship
so that it may be consolidated with a suit for divorce. 277 Mandamus will
issue if the trial court fails to transfer. 278
266. 721 S.W.2d at 530.
267. 717 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).
268. Id. at 188. There being no clear and convincing evidence to support the jury verdict,
the court reversed and remanded. Id. at 189; see also Naquin v. Tex. Dep't of Human Servs.,
722 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, no writ) (court agreed with Austin court as to
endangerment from foster care and also found insufficient evidence to support trial court's
findings and reversed and rendered as to mother).
269. 737 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, no writ).
270. Id. at 28.
271. Id (relying on TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.07(c) (Vernon 1986)).
272. 726 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (construing TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03(a)(8) (Vernon 1986)).
273. Id. at 636.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See Yates v. Gaither, 725 S.W.2d 529, 531-32 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ) (re-
lying on TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.55(c), 11.06(c), (f) (Vernon 1986)).
277. 725 S.W.2d at 531-32.
278. Id.
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